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Abstract
In many communities, land-use and open-space preservation have become important
concerns. Using a large dataset containing every home sale in the state of Massachusetts
over 8 years, this paper simultaneously measures the impact of the mix of land-uses in
the immediate neighborhood of a home on property values and the impact of a locally-
implemented program, the Community Preservation Act (CPA), which provides funds for
local open-space and historic preservation as well as affordable housing. I exploit the panel
nature of the dataset to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis using local as well as
house level fixed effects to overcome omitted variables bias. My results indicate that, on
average, passage of the CPA reduces property values by about 1.5% in Massachusetts towns.
However, when I allow the CPA effect to differ by county, I find some heterogeneity - it
increases property values in some communities and reduces them in others. Variation in local
spending priorities appears to have little impact on property values or the effect of the CPA.
Finally, I find that cropland and pasture, as well as low-density residential development,
are the most preferred local land-uses, and that homes are more expensive as one increases
distance to highways and active rail lines.
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Beyond the basic characteristics of a home such as its size and the size of the property upon
which it sits, within a given real estate market, much of a home’s value derives from the
amenities provided by its location. These locational factors include convenience (distance
to places of employment, shopping, highways, rail stations), amenities (local land-uses,
open-space, parks), disamenities (distance to waste facilities, rail-lines, industrial zones),
as well as regulatory impacts (zoning, historic districts). Policy-makers have long tried to
impact property values through zoning and city/town/urban planning, as well as explicit
policies to preserve/protect open-space, farmland, and wildlife habitat. This paper uses a
fixed-effects, differences-in-differences, approach to examine the impacts of local land uses,
zoning rules, and other locational factors on property values, as well as those of policies
designed to preserve open-space and historic sites, and simultaneously provide for affordable
housing. It focuses on the state of Massachusetts and that state’s Community Preservation
Act (CPA).
Briefly, the CPA is a policy enacted at the town level that allows towns to leverage a
property tax surcharge with state matching funds for the purposes of Open Space Preserva-
tion, Historic Preservation, and Community Housing. The policy, in place since 2001, has
been enacted slowly over time by towns, so that, to date, 142 towns out of a possible 351
have enacted the CPA, and these enactments have been spread over 9 years, 2001-2009. In
fact, some towns are just now taking up the measure. One of the aims of this paper is to
study the ex post impacts of CPA passage on property values.
Of course, while this paper is focusing on one state and one particular policy, this is
hardly an issue that is isolated to Massachusetts. Since 1988, some 1,686 conservation
measures have been approved by voters in at least 43 states out of 2,233 total measures
on ballots. Altogether, these measures have set aside some $53 Billion for conservation.1
Massachusetts is also not the only state to have a matching funds program. New Jersey’s
Green Acres Program is just one other example of a similar policy that provides state aide
1Data from the LandVote database maintained by the Trust for Public Land, http://www.tpl.org/
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to local communities seeking to preserve open space.
An extensive literature on the economic values of varying land-uses exists, mostly fo-
cusing on the value of open-space, variously defined.2 This literature consistently finds
that open-space in its many guises, including cropland, pasture, forest, and urban parks, is
positively related to property values. What is less consistent is the magnitude of this effect.
Empirical estimates of the impact of open-space vary considerably both between studies
and even in different areas within the same study (Heintzelman, 2010). Most often, this
literature has used cross-sectional data to explore the value of open space, and is thus sus-
ceptible to omitted variables bias. A critical contribution of this piece is to use a ‘panel’ like
dataset enabling me use a fixed-effects analysis that greatly reduces the range of possible
omitted variables.
The literature on voter referenda for open-space preservation is considerably less deep.
Kotchen and Powers (2006) and Nelson et. al. (2007) analyze what drives the appearance
and success of these referenda in states and local communities. They find that preserva-
tion is a normal good - wealthier communities are more likely to vote for preservation.
Kotchen and Powers (2006) also find that preservation is most likely in suburban, rather
than urban or rural, communities where development pressure is perceived to be highest.
Only Heintzelman (2010) has previously studied the impacts of these referenda, and a small
sample size prevents him from drawing firm conclusions about the impacts.
My results indicate that, on average, passage of the CPA reduces property values by
about 1.5% in Massachusetts towns. However, when I allow the CPA effect to differ by
county, I find some heterogeneity - it increases property values in some communities and
reduces them in others. Limited evidence exists on the extent to which different local
spending priorities impact the overall effect. I also find that cropland and pasture, as well
as low-density residential development, are the most preferred local land-uses, and that
homes are more expensive as one increases distance to highways and active rail lines.
Section 2 provides a detailed background information on the Community Preservation
2See McConnell and Walls (2005) for a survey or Waltert and Schlapfer (2007) for a meta-analysis of this
literature. For more recent contributions see Heintzelman (2010) and Kuminoff (2008), amongst others.
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Act. Section 3 describes the research methodology. Section 4 provides the results, Section
5 interprets and extends the basic results, and Section 6 concludes.
3
2 Policy Background
The Massachusetts Community Preservation Act was passed in 2000. It is a state program
that provides matching funds to those towns who choose, through a referendum, to enact
property tax surcharges of up to 3% and spend the additional funds, both those raised
through the surcharge and the matching funds, on open-space preservation, historic preser-
vation, and ‘community’ (affordable) housing. In practice, money has also been spent to
provide recreational facilities.3 Towns are required to spend at least 10% of funds raised
on each of the three core areas, and are free to allocate the remaining 70% as they wish.
In general, towns appoint a Community Preservation Committee to recommend projects
to be funded, and final decisions must be approved by the town meeting. The funds are
held in separate from general town accounts and are not available to address other local
spending priorities. The tax surcharge may include any or all of three tax exemptions: for
low income households, for the first $100,000 of property value, and for commercial and in-
dustrial properties. Finally, the adoption process is a two-stage process: first, the language
of the referendum and parameters of the policy, the surcharge rate and possible exemp-
tions, are approved either through the town meeting or through a petition drive; second,
the referendum must be approved in a referendum vote.
As of June 2009, 142 communities have adopted the CPA out of the 351 towns and
cities in Massachusetts. In addition to these communities, some 58 communities have re-
jected the CPA at the referendum stage.4 Figure 2 shows a map of the towns and cities
of Massachusetts by whether they have passed or rejected the CPA. Figure 2 shows a map
of enacting communities color - coded by the date of adoption. According the Commu-
nity Preservation Coalition, an organization that advocates for communities to adopt the
CPA, “Using CPA funds, municipalities have preserved 10,274 acres of open space, includ-
ing important wetland resources such as lakes, rivers, and saltwater ponds. In the area
of affordable housing, CPA funds have allowed for the creation or rehabilitation of more
3From 2001-2007, the state matched locally raised funds at a rate of 100%. In 2008, this fell to 67% and
may be as low as 35% in 2009. The state matching funds come from a fee charged for deed transactions in
the state.







Figure 1: CPA Status
than 2,300 affordable housing units and the development of hundreds of innovative afford-
able housing programs. Finally, more than 1,300 appropriations for historic preservation
projects and over 500 recreation projects have been approved under the program.”5 Of
those communities that have passed the CPA, 52% choose the highest potential surcharge
rate of 3%. The average surcharge rate is 2.227%. 75.35% of enacting towns exempted low
income households and nearly 79% exempted the first $100,000 in home value. Only 3.5% of
towns exempted commercial and industrial property. No communities that have ever passed
the CPA have subsequently withdrawn from the program, and three towns have, subsequent
to initial passage, passed a second referendum to increase the surcharge rate. According
to preliminary data from the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (DOR), quite a bit of
variation exists in how the CPA money that has been raised so far has been spent. On
average, towns have spent about 35% of CPA funds on Open Space, 22% on Affordable
Housing, 13.2% on recreation, and 29.8% on Historic Preservation.6
5“Summary of an Act to Sustain Community Preservation, SB 90”, available at
http://www.communitypreservation.org/CPALegislation.cfm.
6To give an idea of the degree of variation in spending patterns, the standard deviations of these shares,
































CPA Month/Year of Passage
Figure 2: Month/Year of CPA Passage
Intuitively, it is not clear what impact the CPA should have on property values as a
number of possible effects are acting simultaneously. A first thought is that towns are
opting into the program, so presumably a majority of voters in the enacting towns think
that, on average, the policy will be good for their town, and in turn, would be good for
property values. For one thing, through the matching funds, towns are essentially able
to purchase public goods at a reduced price - provided that all of the outcomes of the
CPA are, in fact, public goods. Basic consumer theory tells us that consumers, or, in this
case, towns, cannot be made worse off by a decrease in prices. However, many voters may
have other reasons to vote for the CPA, regardless of the impact on property values. For
instance, renters, or those meeting surcharge exemptions, if in place, stand only to gain
from the CPA as they receive additional public goods at no additional cost. This implies
that a passing vote does not necessarily imply expectations of average improvements in
social welfare. Ignoring the political economy aspects of the problem, it is still not clear
what the impact of the CPA should be. It simultaneously includes both an increase in
taxes and an increase in goods provision. Following Brueckner (1982), average property
6
values will be highest when the level of public goods provision is optimal. So, if the CPA is
moving towns towards the optimum it will increase property values, but if it is pushing them
beyond the optimum it will lower property values. In addition, while the tax-cost of the
CPA is clear up front - consumers presumably have a very good idea of what the surcharge
will imply about their annual tax burden, the benefits of the program, particularly at the
time of the vote, are unclear. Much of the money being raised is simply being set aside for
future purchases, and towns have no ex-ante obligation to publicize the expected uses of
the money. This implies that consumers, in purchasing homes, may be very aware of the
taxes they are paying, but less aware about the benefits being provided. The CPA also has
supply effects. Restrictions on development restrict the supply of housing, which should
increase property values. However, the provisions for affordable housing may undercut
these effects by providing for additional high-density residential development, which both
increases supply of housing and provides a public ‘bad’ in the sense that high density
residential housing generally reduces property values.
7
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
I employ a standard hedonic regression analysis to estimate the effects of land-use charac-
teristics and CPA passage on residential transaction prices. I have data on all residential
property sales in the state of Massachusetts for the years 2000-2007. This dataset include
the sales price, date, and location of the home as well as a number of structural charac-
teristics including lot size, interior size, bedrooms, bathrooms, and some indication of the
‘style’ of the home. I use GIS to attach geographical information such as land-uses, zoning
information, distance to highways, rail lines, and rail stations to the home sales data.7 In
addition, I include monthly, town-level, unemployment rate data from the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue (DOR). Finally, I include town-level data on the CPA including
the date of passage, the surcharge rate, and included exemptions, as well as preliminary
information on CPA expenditures, also from the DOR. After accounting for erroneous ob-
servations and those missing critical pieces of information (most often the date of a home’s
construction), I am left with 623,163 observations.8
This paper, in a sense, is doing double duty by estimating traditional hedonic effects in
addition to the treatment effect of the policy, and to estimate both successfully, I must over-
come some econometric obstacles. A major issue in estimating hedonic models, generally, is
the problem of omitted variables (Parmeter and Pope, 2009). That is the common problem
in any regression analysis whereby, if an unobserved variable is correlated with both the
dependent and one more included independent variables, the estimates of the effects of the
included variables will be biased. An uncountably high number of factors go into the value
of a home, and many of these factors are unobservable to the researcher. So, if follows that
if any of these unobservables are correlated with any of the included characteristics, ones
estimates will be biased. Similarly, in estimating treatment effects, selection bias may be a
problem if the outcome variable, which is, in this case, property values, is correlated with a
factor that, in turn, is correlated with an observation receiving the treatment (Greenstone
7Unfortunately, most of the GIS data is not longitudinal in nature, but is instead a snapshot of a particular
time, which varies by variable. The land-use data come from 1999.
8The base dataset, from The Warren Group, contained 798,202 observations, and so I have been able to
retain 78% of the original observations.
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and Gayer, 2009). A recent literature in environmental economics has sprung up to adapt
quasi-experimental approaches from other fields of economics to environmental issues in
order to deal with these issues.9
There are three broad classes of quasi-experimental approaches: Differences-in-Differences
or Fixed-effects, Instrumental Variables, and Regression Discontinuity (Greenstone and
Gayer (2009), Parmeter and Pope (2009)). In this paper I apply the first of these, the
Differences-in-Differences approach. This approach takes advantage of the ‘panel’ nature of
my dataset to help solve both the omitted variables and selection bias problems identified
above.10 By including census block, census block-group, or even property-level fixed effects,
I am able to control for any constant but unobserved factors that act at the local level and
may be correlated both with property values and the explanatory variables of interest, and
thus greatly reduce the chance of substantial remaining omitted variables or selection bias.
Suppose for instance that towns with higher average incomes are more likely to pass the
CPA. In the absence of fixed effects, I would observe a spurious positive correlation between
passage of the CPA and property values. However, by including the fixed effects, and since
town relative average incomes are likely to be reasonably constant over the sample period,
I am now controlling for this, and any other, static factors. Essentially, my regression co-
efficients will be the average within-group (census block, block-group, or property) impact
of each explanatory variable.
One downside to this approach is that successful estimation will require sufficient within-
group variation in each explanatory variable. Obviously, the smaller the groups the more
factors that are being controlled for in the fixed-effect, but also the less variation that will
be observed and the less statistical power I will have. The reason for this is that other
included static covariates, such as distance to active rail lines, are being measured within
the fixed effects group, so that I am measuring the effects of very small changes in these
distance variables since variation in distance within a census block or block group is, by
9See, for example, Parmeter and Pope (2009), Greenstone and Gayer (2009), and Klaiber and Smith
(2009). For an excellent survey of general program evaluation methods, see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
10This is akin to the approach taken by Deschênes and Greenstone (2007) in a study of the property-value
effects of weather and climate on agricultural land.
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definition, quite small.11 I test the robustness of my results to changing the scale of the
fixed-effect, and will look to balance these competing interests in determining the optimal
scale.
What remains as potential confounding factors in this analysis - in particular the esti-
mation of the treatment effect - are factors that are not constant over time. If any of these
factors are changing co-incident with both property values and the passage of the CPA in
a community, then I could be mis-attributing changes in property values to the CPA. This
would be of particular concern if I had only a small sample of communities being treated.
With my large sample, while these types of factors may be affecting individual communi-
ties, for me to mistake some other effect for that of the CPA it would have to be happening
consistently in most of the 140 treatment communities at the same time as CPA passage,
which varies considerably amongst the treatment communities, and this seems unlikely. To
help with this matter, however, I do include a number of time-dependent controls. To net
out any macro-level trends, I include year dummy variables. I also include month dummies
to account for seasonal effects. Finally, I normalize sales prices according the the Federal
Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) House Price Index. This is calculated at the U.S. Cen-
sus MSA level, which, in Massachusetts, are counties or groups of counties. Together, these
three adjustments de-trend and de-seasonalize the data, and allow me to isolate town-level
effects, like the CPA.
In conducting a hedonic property-value analysis one must also be alert to spatial de-
pendence and spatial auto-correlation.12 A dataset exhibits spatial dependence if, in this
context, property values for nearby properties are not determined independently of one
another. That is, if one property’s value depends on the value of its neighbor’s. Spatial
auto-correlation, similarly, is when the error terms for neighboring or nearby properties
are not independent of one another. Both of these concerns can be expected in hedonic
property-value models. A fully general spatial econometric estimation approach would as-
sume a spatial weighting matrix that would, for any pair of properties describe how ‘close’
11It is also true that the fixed effects do not completely eliminate possible omitted variables bias for these
variables, although it does greatly reduce the scope for this potential problem.
12See LeSage and Pace (2009) for a complete treatment of this subject.
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they are to each other, and, assuming that this matrix is correctly specified, one can control
for both spatial dependence and spatial autocorrelation. Given the size of my dataset, how-
ever, so general an approach is extremely computationally intensive. Conveniently, however,
there are some simpler ways to control for spatial issues. First, spatial dependence can be
partially controlled for by the local-area fixed effects. In effect, this approach allows for spa-
tial dependence within groups, but not across groups. Secondly, spatial autocorrelation can
be controlled for in a similar manner by allowing for error clustering within defined groups
(not necessarily at the same spatial level at the fixed-effects groups), which simultaneously
makes the calculated error terms robust to heteroskedasticity.13
Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Parmeter and Pope (2009),
the form of the estimated equation can then be written:
pijt = λt + αj + zjtβ + xijtδjt + ηjt + εijt (1)
where pijt represents the price of property i in group j at time t; λt represents the set of
time dummy variables; αj represents the group fixed effects; zjt represents the treatment
variable; xijt represents the set of other explanatory variables; and ηjt and εijt represent
group and individual-level error terms respectively.
Another issue in any analysis of land-use issues values is the proper measurement of
land-use. Perhaps the most frequent measure is the distance to the nearest parcel of a
certain type. While this measure has clear merits I do not believe it is the whole story.
Instead, I measure the total acreage of parcels of each type that intersect a buffer around the
transacted properties.14 This, I believe gives a more complete picture of possible impacts.
Figure 3 provides an example of this measure. An implicit tradeoff exists in expanding
the size of the buffer used to measure these land-uses. Larger buffers provide for a more
complete measure of the effects of land-uses on property values. However, larger buffers
also imply less variation in the land-use variables, reducing the power of the estimation,
13Essentially, combined, these fixes allow for spatial weighting matrices containing ‘1’s for all observations
within groups and zeros elsewhere.
14I do not have information on parcel boundaries, so instead use point estimates of each home’s lati-
tude/longitude provided by The Warren Group.
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Figure 3: Example of Land-Use Measures
and also become very computationally expensive. Given the substantial correlation in my
measure of land-use between various buffers, I restrict my measures to buffer radii of 0.1
miles and 0.25 miles.15 I do employ a distance measure for other factors such as the distance
to highways, highway exits, active rail lines, and passenger rail stations.
15Admittedly, it would be nice to have more flexibility in buffer sizes. However, given the size of my
dataset, it is very computationally intensive to calculate the land-use variables for a given buffer, and this
intensity increases with the size of the buffer. So, these two buffers were chosen in an ad hoc fashion, and I
am unable to explore fully the effects of these choices.
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4 Results
I begin by regressing the log of the normalized sales price on the full range of possible ex-
planatory variables, including home characteristics, local land-use characteristics measured
with a 0.1 mile buffer, the zone in which the home is located, a series of other locational
variables, the monthly unemployment rate, and, finally, the CPA status in the town in
which the home is located on the date of the sale.16 That is, the CPA dummy equals one
only in town-months in which the CPA has been passed, and equals zero elsewhere. So, it
is always zero in towns that never pass the CPA, as well as in towns that pass the CPA,
before they pass it. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables included in this
analysis. I include two primary measures of CPA status - a simple dummy variable for
whether or not the CPA had passed in that community prior to the sale date and secondly,
the effective surcharge rate passed in the community, which is zero for those towns that
had not yet enacted the CPA. As mentioned above, I also vary the geographic scale of the
fixed effects to test the robustness of the estimates to this important assumption. Table 2
provides the results of these regressions.
16The semi-log specification is chosen to allow for better comparisons to other literature in this area,
specifically, Cropper, Deck, and McConnell (1988).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
monthurate Monthly Town-Level Unemployment Rate 4.539716 1.655781
rddistance Distance to Highway 0.006755 0.013825
exitsdist Distance to Highway Exit 0.044549 0.049956
trnarcdist Distance to Active Rail Line 0.015873 0.018856
trnnoddist Distance to Passenger Rail Station 0.054687 0.065783
lotsizesf Lot Size (Square Feet) 22746.07 97456.32
grbldgarea Interior Building Area (Square Feet) 2224.684 2764.99
bedrooms Bedrooms 2.738458 1.243927
bathrooms Bathrooms 1.524233 0.852707
halfbaths Halfbaths 0.474044 0.568962
cropland Cropland (Acres) 2.566178 30.74757
pasture Pasture (Acres) 0.395627 3.215353
forest Forest (Acres) 729.9053 2406.253
freshwetland Freshwater Wetlands (Acres) 1.164864 10.98079
mining Open Pit Mining (Acres) 0.106971 2.477815
open Vacant Open Land (Abandoned/Non-Vegetated, Acres) 5.666941 168.714
multires Multi-Family Residential (Acres) 33.58175 216.771
highdensres High-Density Residential (Lots less than 1/4 Acre, Acres) 181.0062 451.5845
meddensres Medium Density Residential (Lots 1/4 to 1/2 Acre, Acres) 108.7597 262.7586
lowdensres Low Density Residential (Lots more than 1/2 Acre, Acres) 17.32016 86.9929
saltwetland Saltwater Wetland (Acres) 1.605651 32.49791
commercial Commercial Land (Acres) 13.47407 53.30502
industrial Industrial Land (Acres) 2.3377 14.32137
urbanopen Urban Open Space (Parks, Acres) 3.843223 23.92888
transporta n Transportation (Roads, Highways, Rail Corridors/Stations, Parking, Acres) 16.7739 87.48042
waste Waste Facilities (Acres) 0.043256 0.821047
freshwater Freshwater/Coastal Embayments (Acres) 6.736147 52.85323
forestag Forested Agriculture (Orchards, Acres) 0.380751 6.11992
age Age of Home (Years) 74.38416 227.0078
Condominium Condominium 0.301492 0.458906
CapeCod Cape Cod Style Home 0.116604 0.320948
Ranch Ranch-Style Home 0.141441 0.348476
Townhouse Townhouse 0.042015 0.200623
Colonial Colonial Home 0.191235 0.393274
Contemporary Contemporary Home 0.020652 0.142218
Apartment Apartment-Style Condominium 0.141835 0.348881
zonecom Zoned Commercial 0.06622 0.248667
zoneind Zoned Industrial 0.023409 0.151199
zonecons Zone Conservation 0.006045 0.077517
zonelowres Zoned Low-Density Residential 0.037022 0.188816
zonelowmed s Zoned Low-Medium Density Residential 0.193629 0.395142
zonemedres Zoned Medium Density Residential 0.161949 0.368404
zonemedhig s Zoned Medium-High Density Residential 0.074448 0.262499
zonehighres Zoned High Density Residential 0.263548 0.440558
zoneagres Zoned Agriculture/Residential 0.036277 0.186979

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regressions 1 and 2 include the CPA dummy, while Regression 3 uses the surcharge rate.
Regression 1 uses census block fixed effects, while Regressions 2 and 3 use census block-
group fixed effects. I will focus mostly on Regressions 2 and 3 in the discussion below. This
is because the results at this broader geographic scale of fixed effects are generally more
significant. This is intuitive, and consistent with Kuminoff, Parmeter, and Pope (2009).
As we increase the scale of the fixed-effect, we perhaps open ourselves up to more omitted
variables, but simultaneously allow for more variation in the included covariates which gives
our estimates more power. At the block-group level, however, we still have 4,991 groups,
each averaging only 125 observations.
The CPA dummy coefficient gives the percentage change in price for a binary change
to the value of the dummy variable. This indicates that passage of the CPA results in a
1.43% to 1.77% reduction in home prices. Similarly the surcharge rate coefficient gives the
percentage change in price for a unit increase in the surcharge rate, and implies a 0.65%
reduction. These results are broadly consistent with each other since most towns choose a
3% surcharge.
Strangely, the monthly unemployment rate is positively related to home prices. This
result is robust to changing the specification of the property value/unemployment rate
relationship. This must reflect some omitted variable that is causing a spurious correlation.
Thankfully, however, omitting the unemployment rate from the analysis does not change
the estimate of the CPA coeffcient, which indicates that whatever is driving this result, it
is not affecting our estimate of the CPA effect.
The distance variables suggest, as we would expect, that people will pay a premium
for increased distance from highways and active rail lines. The estimates for exits and
stations, included in an attempt to separate convenience aspects of transportation from
the associated dis-amenities are not significant, although when using the block-group fixed
effects, the station variable is of the right sign. All of the home characteristic variables
are positive and significant with the exception of age, which is negative, but decreasing
at a decreasing rate. Condominiums are cheaper than single-family homes and relative to
an excluded ‘other-style’ category, Colonials and Contemporaries are more expensive while
16
ranches and flats are less expensive.
The type of ‘zone’ a home is in also affects its value. Relative to an excluded ‘other’
category, commercial, industrial, high-density residential, and conservation zoning, not sur-
prisingly, generally have negative impacts on home prices, while most other residential
categories are positive or insignificant. The conservation zoning result is perhaps most in-
teresting. It suggests that the limitations inherent with such zoning policies are harming
property values, and this may help explain the negative impact of the CPA - if passage of
the CPA implies that a significant sample of homes will be subject to increased restrictions























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, many of the land-use coefficients are significant. Cropland, pasture, and low-
density residential land-uses are positively related to home prices. High and medium density
residential development, as well as commercial, urban open space, transportation, and waste
land-uses are negatively related to home prices. Industrial development is also negatively
related, but it is not quite significant at the 90% level. All of these results are to be expected,
except, perhaps for the urban open space result. Congestion effects associated with use of
these parks may be driving this result. The results presented also highlight the effect of
changing the geographic level of the fixed effect. When fixed effects are calculated at the
census block level, the lack of variation within blocks seems, indeed, to lead to insignificant
estimates of the land-use effects, but this is reversed when expanding the fixed-effects to
the census block-group level.17 These results are robust to increasing the buffer size to
0.25 miles. Table 3 compares the coefficients for the land-use variables in each of the
three base regressions described above for the 0.1 mile and 0.25 mile buffers. Estimates
are remarkably consistent between the two buffers, and, in most cases, coefficient levels
are lower in absolute value at the quarter-mile buffer than at the tenth-mile buffer which
suggests that homeowners care more about land uses closer to their home. Note also, the
consistency in estimates of the referendum effect.18 Table 4 reports some results from a
regression including land-use variables for the 0.1 mile buffer together with the acres of each
land use that intersect the 0.25 mile buffer but not the 0.1 mile buffer. These results are
all consistent with the results reported above.
17There are 69,320 census blocks represented in my dataset, with an average of only 9 observations per
block. There are only 4,991 census block groups represented in the dataset, with an average of about 125
observations per block-group.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Base Regression Regression Results: Repeat Sample
Dependent: Log(Normalized Sale Price) Coef. P > |t|
CPA Dummy -0.017790∗∗ 0.000000
Open Space Spending (Million$) 0.0022 0.139000
Affordable Housing Spending (Million$) 0.0002 0.667000
Recreation Spending (Million$) 0.0018 0.725000
Historic Preservation Spending (Million$) 0.0051† 0.071000




Fixed Effects Level Property
Number of Obs 155836
Adj R-squared (Within) 0.0114
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Given the size of my dataset and the relatively large sample period, a significant number
of properties sell more than once in my sample. Limiting analysis just to these observations
gives us a true fixed-effects model and greatly reduces the scope for potential omitted
variables bias. This gives the cleanest possible estimate of the referendum effect, and results
are presented in Table 5. The result from the full-sample analysis, that the CPA negatively
impacts property values is confirmed in this analysis, and the magnitude is almost identical
to that estimated above. This analysis also includes variables representing the running
sum of reported CPA expenditures in each of four areas: open-space, affordable housing,
recreation, and historic preservation. All seem to be positively related to property values,
but only historic preservation spending is significant. An alternative specification, which




The regression coefficients described above indicate a negative and significant impact of
CPA passage on property values of about 1.5%, on average. It is straightforward to put
this number in perspective. For the average home, this reduction amounts to a reduction in
price of about $1,991. On the other hand, the average increase in taxation from the CPA
is about $112 per year. The present value cost of this additional tax, at a 5% interest rate
is $2,352 and so the tax is being capitalized into property values at a rate of about 85%.
This rate of tax capitalization is somewhere between the consensus estimates from the tax
capitalization literature by Palmon and Smith (1998) and Oates (1966) of between 56% and
66% and that predicted by Ricardian equivalence - 100%.
As with any regression coefficient, however, this estimate of the referendum effect is
simply an average effect across the sample. To see the extent of variation away from this
estimate, I interact the CPA dummy with county dummies and with the land-use measures.
Table 6 provides the estimates of the interaction terms from this regression. 19 There
are significant negative impacts of the CPA in two counties, Middlesex and Norfolk, and
significant positive effects in Hampshire, Nantucket, and Plymouth counties. The point
estimates range from a 3.7% decline in values in Middlesex County to a 4.7% increase in
values in Plymouth County. The large negative impacts in Middlesex and Norfolk counties
may be helping to drive the overall negative average effect of the CPA since Middlesex and
Norfolk are two of the three largest counties in terms of number of observations. This result
does not have an obvious explanation, although a possible explanation for the Middlesex
result is that a very large share, some 31%, of existing CPA spending has been on affordable
housing, the second-highest in the sample. The Land-Use interaction results are also very
interesting. We see that high-density residential and industrial land have positive impacts
on the CPA effect, while low-density residential land has a negative impact on the CPA
effect. This suggests that those homes in more densely developed areas stand to benefit
more from the CPA than those in less densely developed areas, which is consistent with
19The estimates for the other variables, the same as those in Table 2 are very similar to those in the base
regression.
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Table 6: County and Land-Use Interaction Results
Interaction Term (*Referendum) Coefficient t-stat P > |t|
Barnstable (Baseline) -0.0058474 -0.64 0.519
Berkshire 0.0239911 0.67 0.501
Bristol 0.0187450 1.14 0.252
Dukes 0.0123199 0.35 0.725
Essex -0.0134161 -0.9 0.369
Franklin -0.0092139 -0.23 0.818
Hampden -0.0171248 -1.46 0.144
Hampshire 0.0251612† 1.71 0.087
Middlesex -0.0377506∗∗ -3.2 0.001
Nantucket 0.1106750∗ 2.11 0.035
Norfolk -0.0295369∗∗ -2.67 0.008
Plymouth 0.0476539∗∗ 3.79 0
Worcester -0.0165742 -1.03 0.305
Cropland 0.0000005 0.01 0.993
Pasture 0.0005590 0.82 0.413
Forest -0.0000005 -0.29 0.772
Freshwater Wetlands -0.0001827 -0.84 0.4
Open Pit Mining 0.0002478 0.64 0.523
Vacant Open Land -0.0000907 -1.52 0.13
Multi-Family Residential 0.0000231 0.44 0.659
High-Density Residential 0.0000232∗ 2.54 0.011
Medium Density Residential -0.0000083 -0.58 0.561
Low Density Residential -0.0000809∗∗ -5.31 0
Saltwater Wetland 0.0001514 1.62 0.105
Commercial Land 0.0002659 1.41 0.158
Industrial Land 0.0002948† 1.79 0.073
Urban Open Space -0.0003786 -1.32 0.188
Transportation -0.0000240 -0.42 0.672
Waste Facilities -0.0041133 -1.16 0.247
Freshwater/Coastal Embayments 0.0000708 0.77 0.444
Forested Agriculture -0.0000144 -0.05 0.959
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
intuition since open-space is presumably more scarce in more densely developed areas.
More generally, this observed heterogeneity in impact is consistent with prior literature
(Heintzelman (2010), Geoghegan (2003), Anderson and West (2006)), which has found the
same sorts of heterogeneity in estimating the value of open space preservation.
Similar to the true fixed-effects analysis including only repeat-sales, I tried including data
on spending in the full-sample regressions. I attempt a number of specifications, and very
few of them yield any significant results. One result that is consistent across specifications,
however, is that total spending is negative and significant while its square is positive and
significant. When these terms are included, the magnitude of the estimate for the effect of
23
the CPA is reduced, although it is still significant and negative. This suggests that larger
programs have larger negative effects, which is consistent with the result from estimating
the effect of the rate rather than just the CPA dummy. If I leave out the total spending
variables and instead include only categorical spending variables rather than categorical
shares, expenditures on Open Space, Affordable Housing and Recreation have negative
impacts, although only that for Affordable Housing is significant, while expenditures on
Historic Preservation are positive, but insignificant. This gives some evidence that, of the
four categories, affordable housing is the least preferred and most likely to decrease property
values.
Moving to the measures of land-use, it is interesting to discuss these results with the aid
of a simple heuristic - what is the effect on sales price if 1 acre of land near a home changes
from an open space category to a developed category. Table 7 presents the results of asking
this question for the median home in the state-wide sample.20 Notice, as an example, that
replacing an acre of pasture with an acre of commercial development would reduce price by
almost $180. Of course, most commercial developments are at a considerably larger scale,
implying much larger price effects. The most preferred land-uses, which are also statistically
significant, are Pasture and Cropland, implying, perhaps, that something about farmland
makes it preferable to other low-density uses. Even conversion to low-density residential
development would lower neighboring home prices.
20Only changes in prices from increases in acreage are presented. The results for decreases are, obviously,









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper provides evidence that preservation policies, while generally providing public
goods, and even when approved through a voter-referendum, may not be positively capi-
talized into home values. Using the quasi-experimental method of differences-in-differences
analysis, I find that, in the case of the Massachusetts Community Preservation Act, pas-
sage of the CPA has had an overall negative impact on property values of about 1.5%
in towns that pass the CPA. This effect is observed to be heterogeneous across counties
and according to local land-use characteristics, with more densely developed areas seeing
more benefits than those less densely developed. Nonetheless, the land-uses that are at
least partially being targeted for preservation under the CPA do appear to have value for
homeowners, relative to more developed uses. While it remains somewhat of a puzzle why
towns would pass policies that are negatively affecting property values, it can explain why,
in many towns, passage of the CPA is controversial, and why more than half the towns in
Massachusetts still have not adopted the policy.21 I present some evidence that spending
on Community Housing helps to drive down the impact of the CPA, which is consistent
with intuition, but more work needs to be done to fully establish that point.
21Of the 140 communities that passed the CPA before 2008, the median margin was 58% to 42%. In
addition, 58 towns rejected the measure, and another 151 towns have not put it to a vote.
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